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TALES, TECHS, AND TERRITORIES: 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
GLOBALIZATION, AND THE LEGAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF BORDERLESSNESS 




The Internet has often been described as “borderless,” owing to the 
technical features of Internet communications that make content accessible to 
anyone with a network connection, regardless of his or her location. This 
borderlessness has been widely thought both to confound legal regimes relying 
on territoriality and to fundamentally create a crisis for jurisdictional 
determination of both public- and private-law matters. The borderless Internet 
has thus entered into the loose pantheon of phenomena that herald the arrival 
of globalization—that vague collection of trends that purportedly erase, or at 
least significantly compromise, the authority of intermediary levels of social, 
political, economic, and legal orders such as the nation, state, or province.1 
The coincidence of the popularization of Internet use and globalization 
rhetoric in the 1990s undoubtedly colored the interpretation of the legal 
significance of Internet technology. The legal handling of the Internet’s capacity 
for uncontrolled crossing of territorial borders informs and shapes our 
understanding of the Internet in two ways: first, by framing the substantive 
issues arising from the application of local law as a conflict between a 
cosmopolitanism that embraces global community and a parochialism that 
thwarts global community; second, by framing procedural issues as a contest 
between simple and complex approaches to determining the significance of new 
legal circumstances arising from the technology or the relationships it enables, 
or both. Without such a critical examination into the legal framing of Internet 
borderlessness, we fail to truly appreciate that the substantive and procedural 
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 1. See David Westbrook, Theorizing the Diffusion of Law: Conceptual Difficulties, Unstable 
Imaginations, and the Effort To Think Gracefully Nonetheless, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 489, 490–92 (2006). 
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aspects of Internet-related cases work together to determine the legal meaning 
of Internet technologies. 
One of the most striking features of cases that touch more than one 
jurisdiction through the Internet is how narrowly the interjurisdictional issues 
are often construed. As conflicts-of-laws scholars have complained in other 
contexts, courts in Internet cases almost always confine conflicts issues to the 
exercise of prescriptive or personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, which 
is collapsed with the determination that local law applies. In other words, courts 
in these cases virtually never engage in a full conflicts analysis to determine 
whether foreign law ought to be applied.2 
The interjurisdictional issues raised in Internet tort cases, for instance, are 
quite often determined via the localization of the tort, wherein new 
circumstances introduced by Internet technology are converted into facts calling 
for a more straightforward exercise of territorial authority over people who 
have caused events to occur within a jurisdiction and so are naturally subject to 
local law. I do not attempt to explain here why this is so, leaving that for 
conflicts-of-laws scholars, but rather seek to set out how courts and scholars cast 
Internet technology’s significance in resolving disputes that arise from online 
communications. 
Cyberlaw scholarship can serve the role for legal scholarship that science-
and-technology-studies scholarship plays for science3—that is, rejecting the 
assumption that technologies have fixed forms and neutral meaning, an 
assumption that conceals the ways technologies are socially influenced and their 
meaning constructed.4 Some have advocated applying such critical methods to 
look at the law itself,5—that is, at the ways legal techniques are not natural or 
inevitable, and the ways that legal form has agency in the production of legal 
conclusions.6 
This article takes up both of these theoretical orientations by critically 
examining the two levels of private international law’s engagement with 
Internet technology, primarily in Canadian Internet-related tort cases with 
American defendants: (1) through tracing the various narrative figures that give 
legal meaning to Internet borderlessness by invoking the cosmopolitan–
 
 2. Many authors of cyber-law textbooks contribute to this trend by limiting their sections on 
jurisdiction primarily to whether content providers will be subjected to local law in foreign jurisdictions. 
See, e.g., MICHEAL A. GEIST, INTERNET LAW IN CANADA, 1–125  (Captus Press Inc., 3d ed. 2002) 
(2000); DAVID W. QUINTO, LAW OF INTERNET DISPUTES, 12-1–12-72 (2001). These texts, intended for 
students and professionals, do not focus primarily on private international law. 
 3. Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210, 250 (2007). 
 4. Id; see also Richard Ford, Against Cyberspace, in THE PLACE OF LAW 147–77 (Austin Sarat et 
al. eds., 2003). Both Cohen and Ford argue that space (and consequently jurisdiction) is socially 
constructed. This article is concerned less about the social constructedness of borders per se than about 
the ways territorial borders, though accepted by most legal scholars and certainly courts as “real,” are 
nonetheless subject to assignment of legal significance and consequently are “constructed” in law. 
 5. Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities, 53 
BUFF. L. REV. 973, 984–85 (2005). 
 6. Id. at 988. 
SLANE__BOOK PROOF_FINAL.DOC 10/27/2008  7:58:23 AM 
Summer 2008] TALES, TECHS, AND TERRITORIES 131 
parochial rubric, and (2) through tracing the ways these cases promote simple 
or complex private-international-law methods as most appropriate to disputes 
arising from cross-border communications. 
II 
THE PRODUCTION OF THE LEGAL MEANING OF INTERNET BORDERLESSNESS 
Globalization rhetoric has been described as debased: “It too often involves 
exaggerated, misleading, meaningless, superficial, ethnocentric, or just plain 
false statements about processes and phenomena that are better discussed in 
less hyperbolic terms.”7 The exaggerations can go in utopian or dystopian 
directions, leading either to a new, harmonious, global human community, or to 
an oppressive homogenization of differences, usually at the expense of less-
powerful populations. The utopian vision tends to strive for freedom from the 
law of individual nations in favor of respect for the choices of Internet 
participants (to either govern themselves or to choose by whom to be 
governed), while the dystiopian vision tends to reject the dissolution of 
sovereign authority insofar as doing so recapitulates global power imbalances. 
Either vision may be favorably aligned with cosmopolitanism (as providing a 
more open and flexible framework for Internet users as individuals, or as 
providing a means for otherwise silenced populations to be heard). But so, too, 
can either vision be negatively aligned with parochialism (as providing another 
means for more powerful parties to ensure the most favorable legal regime will 
govern, or as thwarting the march of progress by subjecting Internet users to 
multiple local regulations). Although the terms “cosmopolitan” and “parochial” 
shape these arguments, either explicitly or implicitly, clearly neither term is 
fixed and neither can be deployed to varying rhetorical ends. 
For the most part, the production of the legal meaning of Internet 
borderlessness has followed two narrative lines, both of which operate within 
the cosmopolitan–parochial rubric.8 The first began with the early consideration 
of Internet activity as occurring in a virtual place without borders, and therefore 
not subject to conventional territorial law (where Internet activities take place 
“everywhere and nowhere”).9 This early form of the narrative soon shifted to 
 
 7. William Twining, Diffusion and Globalization Discourse, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 507, 508 (2006). 
 8. As Robert Cover has famously stated, “No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart 
from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning. For every constitution there is an epic, for each 
[D]ecalogue a scripture. Once understood in the context of the narratives that give it meaning, law 
becomes not merely a system of rules to be observed, but a world in which we live.” Robert Cover, 
Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4–5 (1983). 
 9. The phrase “everywhere and nowhere” appears in John Perry Barlow’s famous “A Declaration 
of the Independence of Cyberspace.” John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of Independence of 
Cyberspace (Feb. 8, 1996), http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html (last visited Apr. 22, 
2008). The phrase also appears in the lyrics to the 1967 song Hi Ho Silver Lining by Jeff Beck. Barlow 
is a former lyricist for the Grateful Dead, and is a co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation. 
The Electronic Frontier Foundation is a civil-liberties group whose mission is to defend individual 
rights in the digital world. Electronic Frontier Foundation, Home, http://www.eff.org/ (last visited Jan. 
18, 2008). 
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one more fundamentally connected with the territorial world, where universal 
accessibility is feared to lead to parochial assertion of state authority in every 
jurisdiction—that is, “everywhere and nowhere” became everywhere and 
anywhere. This fear lead to a call for defendant-centered rules, as defendants 
feared they might be exposed to liability everywhere that Internet content could 
be accessed. The second narrative line developed in reaction to the first; in it, 
the relevance of borders is reasserted in contexts where “something more” than 
mere accessibility is at issue.10 In this narrative line, setting out the contours of 
that “something more” becomes an exercise in determining when foreign 
audiences should be considered part of the community that is addressed by 
Internet communications—where Internet disputes take place here, there (and 
everywhere)—since the fact that content is accessible elsewhere (or indeed 
everywhere) is deemed not relevant to the dispute.11 
These narrative figures ascribe very different legal meanings to Internet 
“borderlessness,” even as they all acknowledge the capacity of Internet 
communications to facilitate global interactions—that is, to potentially allow a 
person to be heard everywhere. Specific instances of these narratives express 
different degrees of openness to the position that a new technology requires 
rethinking whether substantive local law applies to an event that can be 
construed to occur within the territory. 
Cases wherein a central determination concerns the relevance of the 
recipients of Internet communications as public audiences are particularly 
illuminating. Although the legal scholarship on Internet law invokes the 
cosmopolitan–parochial rubric more generally, courts or parties to proceedings 
invoke it most forcefully in cases dealing with the receipt of information across 
borders by public audiences.12 Canadian Internet-defamation cases will 
therefore serve as the primary examples through which to explore the instances 
in which the above narrative figures play a prominent role. The reasons why 
these cases should be the primary locus for working out these tensions are 
surely related to the prominent role that information exchange plays in visions 
of global community. That these cases involve U.S. defendants and Canadian 
 
 10. The phrase “something more” comes from the line of U.S. defamation cases that descended 
from Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). E.g., Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et 
l’Antisemitisme, 379 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2004); Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 263 
(4th Cir. 2002). In those cases, courts interpreted Calder as having required something more than the 
mere foreseeability that damage would be caused in a plaintiff’s jurisdiction to allow a suit to be heard 
there. 
 11. U.S. courts have deemed an explicit intent to target a plaintiff’s forum through online 
communications to satisfy the “something more” requirement. See, e.g., Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. 
Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000); People ex rel. Vacco v. World Interactive 
Gaming, 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 848–850 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999). Canadian courts have not limited the 
“something more” requirement to audience targeting by a defendant, as will be discussed further with 
regard to the “here, there (and everywhere)” narrative. See infra II.B. 
 12. Defamation cases are the most prominent Internet-based disputes involving receipt of 
information by public audiences. The cosmopolitan–parochial rubric is invoked by both the courts and 
the parties in the much-discussed Australian defamation case Gutnick v. Dow Jones and Co., Inc. 
(2001) V.S.C. 305 (Austl.), aff’d, Dow Jones & Co, Inc. v. Gutnick (2002) 194 A.L.R. 433 (Austl.). 
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audiences further speaks to the relatively marginal status of Canadian 
audiences in the publics directly addressed by U.S. information providers. In 
this way, these cases are fundamentally about globalization, in that information 
dissemination is a key paradigm of the global. 
A. From Everywhere and Nowhere to Everywhere and Anywhere 
It is by now nearly legend that the earliest champions of the Internet’s 
borderlessness tended to embrace the libertarian possibilities of a 
communications environment unmoored from physical restrictions and not 
subject to the governments that rule over the physical world.13 The most famous 
and storied advocate of this position is John Perry Barlow, one of the founders 
of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, whose 1996 manifesto, “A Declaration 
of the Independence of Cyberspace,”14 is easily the most oft-quoted document 
of the early era.15 Barlow stated that existing territorial governments have no 
sovereignty in cyberspace, because “[c]yberspace does not lie within your 
borders.”16 Indeed, as he puts it, cyberspace “is a world that is both everywhere 
and nowhere, but it is not where bodies live.”17 Cyberspace is thereby 
understood as a curiously de-territorialized space, an exciting possibility for a 
new frontier fundamentally outside the reach of existing laws and regulations. 
The popular variant of the cosmopolitan vision of the Internet that 
embraces this new frontier and what it can achieve for global human society is 
amply illustrated in advertising campaigns for Internet-related services from the 
1990s. These ads invested global access to the Internet with a capacity to unite 
all peoples of the world in the common purpose of information exchange. A 
Microsoft advertising campaign from 1995, for instance, featured an Internet 
accessed by ethnically diverse people typing or reading aloud in myriad 
languages. The advertisement culminated in Microsoft’s 1994–2002 company 
slogan: “Where do you want to go today?”18 The direct address and clarity of 
this slogan implies that anyone is free to travel, via the Internet, anywhere he or 
she pleases. This mode of address deliberately elides any differences (political, 
 
 13. Philip Agre notes that reactions to Internet technology ran the whole political spectrum: by his 
typology, the libertarian left and right, alike, projected images of decentralization and destruction of 
existing institutions, from the left as an opportunity for radical democracy, from the right as an 
opportunity to allow the market to determine the shape of the future. The nonlibertarian left 
approached the Internet as yet another instrument of capitalist domination and expansion, while the 
nonlibertarian right saw it as yet another instrument of moral decay. Philip E. Agre, Cyberspace as 
American Culture, 11 SCI. AS CULTURE 171, 185 (2002). 
 14. Barlow, supra note 9. 
 15. See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontier or Feudal Society?: Metaphors and Perceptions of 
Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1207, 1212 (2002); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the 
Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 447 (2003). 
 16. Barlow, supra note 9. 
 17. Id. 
 18. A valuable database of advertisements of multi- and transnational corporations is available 
online: Robert Goldman et al., Landscapes of Capital: Representing Time, Space and Globalization in 
Corporate Advertising, http://it.stlawu.edu/~global/pagesintro/mapfive.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2008). 
This database accompanies the analytical project of sociologists Robert Goldman and Stephen Papson. 
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economic, or cultural) that would surely make free travel, even via the Internet, 
more difficult for some world populations than for others. A similar campaign 
was run by Canadian telecommunications company Nortel Networks, 
prominently featuring their likewise difference-leveling slogan:“What do you 
want the Internet to be?”19 U.S. and Canadian companies shared a similar vision 
of limitless possibility and a message of universal empowerment. 
Legal scholars David Johnson and David Post most famously took on the 
challenge of considering what law in this sort of cyberspace would look like. In 
their seminal 1996 article, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 
Johnson and Post took seriously the idea of cyberspace as a separate place by 
positing that Internet users crossed a border more significant than any 
territorial border when they went online (that is, the border between online and 
offline) and so should evolve their own norms and rules of behavior rather than 
be governed by offline laws.20 Support for private ordering by Internet users has 
been widespread,21 often characterizing online forums as cosmopolitan and as 
threatened by the incursion of parochial norms by national legal systems.22  
Casting the assertion of national interest as parochial rests on an assumption 
that crossing multiple borders negates the legitimacy of claims by any one 
territory. Johnson and Post, for instance, write: 
Governments cannot stop electronic communications from coming across their 
borders, even if they want to do so. Nor can they credibly claim a right to regulate the 
Net based on supposed local harms caused by activities that originate outside their 
borders and that travel electronically to many different nations. One nation’s legal 
institutions should not monopolize rule-making for the entire Net.23 
 For Johnson and Post, the claim that territorially bound authorities cannot 
make a legitimate claim to regulate cross-border communications that cause 
local harm follows from the fact that these same communications “travel 
electronically to many different nations.”24 In other words, the local 
jurisdiction’s claim is vacated by the mere fact of the global nature of the 
communication. Such visions of Internet borderlessness privilege the global 
over the local, invoking a public-policy rationale for preferring international 
 
 19. Robert Goldman et al., Making it Social, Making it Emotional, 
http://it.stlawu.edu/~global/pageslandscapes/nortelsign33.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2008). 
 20. David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. 
L. REV. 1367, 1378–79 (1996). 
 21. See, e.g., Matthew R. Burnstein, Conflicts on the Net: Choice of Law in Transnational Space, 29 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 75, 96 (1996); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of 
Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 555 (1998). 
 22. See, e.g., John T. Delacourt, The International Impact of Internet Regulation, 38 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 207, 234 (1997) (“The national regimes imposed by the United States, Germany, and China apply 
parochial norms to a cosmopolitan space in an attempt to constrain a medium whose principal value is 
its flexibility.”); Leon E. Trakman, From the Medieval Law Merchant to E-Merchant Law, 53 UNIV. OF 
TORONTO L.J. 265, 281 (“Like the medieval Law Merchant, a twenty-first-century Law Merchant is 
evolving that is cosmopolitan in nature and transcends the parochial interests of nation states.”). 
 23. Johnson & Post, supra note 20, at 1390. 
 24. Id. 
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over national interests, in which “international” is often collapsed with 
individual content provider interests. 
Embedded within this privileging of the global over the local (via the 
cosmopolitan–parochial rubric) is another more-subtle move that translates 
Barlow’s de-territorialized cyberspace into a phenomenon territorialized in 
ways that law more readily understands. Specifically, although Barlow’s 
cyberspace is “everywhere and nowhere,”25 Johnson and Post’s is “everywhere 
but nowhere in particular.”26 Under this modified conception of Barlow’s 
cyberspace, cyberspace no longer “does not lie within your borders,”27 but 
instead “cut[s] across territorial border.”28 Despite their advocacy for self-
governance,29 Johnson and Post’s cyberspace shifts the conceptual frame from 
one structured by an opposition between physical and virtual to one structured 
by an opposition between global and local, which makes Internet technology 
more readily manageable by private-international-law approaches. 
The “everywhere but nowhere in particular”30 variation on Barlow’s 
legendary vision appears in cases in which courts have stated that a defendant’s 
address to the world at large neutralizes the claims of any one specific locale.31 
Although not truly “nowhere”— since at least the defendant’s home forum is 
presumed to have authority over the dispute—the cosmopolitan–parochial 
rubric interprets the nonspecific address as negating the legal significance of 
information flowing into a specific territory.32 In other words, when the world at 
large is the audience, parochial norms do not apply. 
With the shift from physical–virtual to global–local, exercising jurisdiction 
and potentially applying local law became a hotbed of controversy in Internet-
based disputes.33 The utopian vision of an alternate universe self-governed by 
participants gave way to the earth-bound desire to be everywhere but not be 
subject to legal liability anywhere except in one’s home jurisdiction. This is the 
legal narrative underpinning the utopian possibilities expressed in the Microsoft 
and Nortel advertisements described above,34 or in the advocacy of such public-
interest projects as the OpenNet Initiative35 and the Global Internet Liberty 
 
 25. Barlow, supra note 9. 
 26. Johnson & Post, supra note 20, at 1378. 
 27. Barlow, supra note 16. 
 28. Johnson & Post, supra note 20, at 1367. 
 29. Id. at 1383. 
 30. Id. at 1376. 
 31. See, e.g., Am. Info. Corp. v. Am. Infometrics, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 696, 700 (D. Md. 2001) 
(federal court action in the United States); Desjean v. Intermix Media Inc., [2006] F.C. 1395 at para. 42 
(Can.) (federal court action in Canada). 
 32. Am. Info. Corp, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 700; Desjean, F.C. 1395 para. 35. 
 33. Am. Info. Corp, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 700; Desjean, F.C. 1395 para. 35. See also Panavision Int’l v. 
Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998); GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. Bellsouth Corp., 199 F.3d 
1343, 1347–50 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336–37 (5th Cir. 1999); 
Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 34. See supra II.A. 
 35. OpenNet Initiative, Home, http://opennet.net/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2008). 
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Campaign.36 Along with the desire to be everywhere came the anxiety that the 
freedom (and power) to be global would be squelched by overzealous courts 
asserting parochial interests and imposing local laws on content providers 
merely because that content could be accessed within those courts’ jurisdictions. 
This double-edged “everywhere and anywhere” narrative became common in 
court cases,37 commentary,38 and scholarship,39 thereby elevating the frequency 
and prominence of public-policy arguments against the assumption of 
jurisdiction in Internet cases. 
 
 36. Global Internet Liberty Campaign, Home, http://www.gilc.org/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2008); see 
also Electronic Frontier Foundation, Home, http://www.eff.org/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2008); Center for 
Democracy and Technology, Mission and Principles, http://www.cdt.org/mission/ (last visited Jan. 15, 
2008). 
 37. See, e.g., Am. Info. Corp., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 701 (“In the case at bar, the burden on the 
defendant at least balances the plaintiff’s interest in convenience, and the availability of jurisdiction 
anywhere in the country, over anyone with a Web site that accepts a rudimentary form inquiry, hardly 
promotes the most efficient resolution of controversies.”); GTE New Media Servs., Inc., 199 F.3d at 
1350 (“When stripped to its core, GTE’s theory of jurisdiction rests on the claim that, because the 
defendants have acted to maximize usage of their websites in the District, mere accessibility of the 
defendants’ websites establishes the necessary ‘minimum contacts’ with this forum. [internal citation 
omitted] This theory simply cannot hold water. Indeed, under this view, personal jurisdiction in 
Internet-related cases would almost always be found in any forum in the country.”); Cybersell, Inc., 130 
F.3d at 419 (“While there is no question that anyone, anywhere could access that home page and 
thereby learn about the services offered, we cannot see how from that fact alone it can be inferred that 
Cybersell FL deliberately directed its merchandising efforts toward Arizona residents.”). In Canada, 
see, e.g., Braintech, Inc. v. Kostiuk (Braintech II), [1999] 171 D.L.R. (4th) 46 para. 63 (Can.) (“It would 
create a crippling effect on freedom of expression if, in every jurisdiction the world over in which access 
to Internet could be achieved, a person who posts fair comment on a bulletin board could be haled 
before the courts of each of those countries where access to this bulletin could be obtained.”); Desjean 
v. Intermix Media Inc., [2006] F.C. 1395 para. 35 (Can.) (“It would be manifestly unfair to subject 
Intermix to this Court’s jurisdiction since it would, in effect, mean a U.S.-based operator of a website, 
with no business assets in Canada and no physical presence in the jurisdiction, could be sued in this 
country as well as in any other country from which a plaintiff might choose to download its products.”). 
 38. See, e.g., Robert W. Hamilton & Gregory A. Castanias, Tangled Web: Personal Jurisdiction and 
the Internet, 24 NO. 2 LITIGATION 27, 27 (1998) (“Since the World Wide Web typically is viewable from 
any computer on the Internet, anywhere in the world, does the owner of a Website therefore have 
‘minimum contacts’ sufficient to be haled into court anywhere his Website might cause injury?”); Rieko 
Mashima, Problem of the Supreme Court’s Obscenity Test Concerning Cyberporn: Community 
Standards Remaining after ACLU v. Reno, 16 THE COMPUTER LAWYER 23, 23 (1999) (“Information 
on the Internet can be received virtually by anybody anywhere without the sender’s notice, thus 
reinforcing the pressure to comply with the standard of the strictest community should a sender hope to 
avoid potential trouble.”). 
 39. See, e.g., Michael S. Rothman, It’s a Small World After All: Personal Jurisdiction, the Internet 
and the Global Marketplace, 23 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 127, 186 (1999) (“With increasing frequency, 
courts are being faced with factual situations where a defendant’s contacts with the forum state meet 
the requirements of ‘minimum contacts,’ yet do not comport with traditional notions of ‘fair play and 
substantial justice’ inherent in the due process analysis (or the international standard of 
reasonableness). Consequently, cases involving the Internet will increase pressure on this second prong 
of the due process analysis and courts should use this prong to successfully protect defendants.”); 
Kendrick D. Nguyen, Redefining the Threshold for Personal Jurisdiction: Contact and the Presumption 
of Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 253, 279 (2003) (“With the presumption-of-reasonableness approach in 
practice, we can hope to reinstate the equilibrium between personal jurisdiction and twenty-first 
century American society. It is inevitable that personal jurisdiction will evolve to adapt to the 
environment sooner or later, but we undoubtedly prefer it to be sooner. As we have the ability to make 
that happen now, courts should act before the defunct legal concept of minimum contacts wreaks havoc 
in society by perpetuating unfairness and public distrust.”). 
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The initial impetus for the “everywhere and anywhere” narrative came from 
cases in which courts did find liability for mere accessibility on a foreseeability 
basis: to choose to post information on the Internet is to know that you may be 
liable anywhere in the world.40 This pure-foreseeability approach had a rare and 
short-lived legal life, replaced by variously phrased requirements of “something 
more” than mere accessibility, which is the central project of the “here, there 
(and everywhere)” narrative figure discussed below.41 Yet the threat of 
expansive exercising of personal jurisdiction based on mere accessibility and the 
resulting application of unfavorable local law has had much greater prominence 
as a rhetorical strategy. This strategy has been routinely deployed by 
defendants seeking to avoid liability in foreign jurisdictions for online content, 
regardless of their degree of activity in relation to the forum. Indeed, insofar as 
the “something more” requirement is vague and leaves open the possibility that 
not much more than mere accessibility is sufficient for a court to exercise 
jurisdiction, it invites this kind of counterargument. 
The first Canadian case to consider Internet-based jurisdictional issues was 
Braintech, Inc. v. Kostiuk (Braintech I).42  To date, it is the only Canadian case 
to consider liability for mere accessibility, and it has consequently been the only 
case to employ the “everywhere and anywhere” narrative.43 Braintech I was an 
action brought in British Columbia to enforce a Texas defamation judgment 
obtained by a company with some presence in Texas against a British Columbia 
resident who posted comments on an online bulletin board.44 The trial court 
ruled the Texas judgment enforceable,45 reasoning that the suit had sufficient 
connection with Texas because of the plaintiff’s presence in Texas and the 
presence of some of the plaintiff’s investors in Texas, and accepted the Texas 
court’s holding that the defamation was published in Texas via the Internet. In 
other words, the harm had been suffered in Texas.46 On appeal, the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal reversed.47 It held that the other factors connecting 
the dispute to Texas became relevant only if the last conclusion, that the tort 
occurred partly in Texas, was valid.48 The court’s reduction of the connecting-
factors method to a variant of a single-situs test is a prominent example of the 
 
 40. See, e.g., Playboy Ent., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996) (ordering foreign defendant, based in Italy, to be held in contempt of court for violating court’s 
prior injunction enjoining defendant from selling or distributing goods, which infringed on a U.S. 
trademark, in the United States); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 
1996) (court asserted territorial jurisdiction in a trademark-infringement action noting that by posting 
advertising on the Internet, defendant directed its advertising toward “not only the state of 
Connecticut, but to all states”). 
 41. See infra II.B. 
 42. Braintech I, [1998] 88 A.C.W.S. 565 (Can.), rev’d, Braintech II, 171 D.L.R. (4th) 46 (Can.). 
 43. See Braintech II, 171 D.L.R. (4th) 46 para. 62 (Can.), rev’d [1998] 88 A.C.W.S. 565 (Can.). 
 44. Braintech I, 88 A.C.W.S. 565 para. 20 (Can.). 
 45. Id. para. 22. 
 46. Id. para 20. 
 47. Braintech II, 171 D.L.R. (4th) 46 paras. 69–70 (Can.). 
 48. Id. para. 58. 
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draw toward simplicity as an appropriate procedural solution to disruptions 
caused by Internet technology.49 The “everywhere and anywhere” narrative 
figure justifies the court’s procedural move via a purely negative public-policy 
rationale—namely, that mere accessibility is not enough to warrant the exercise 
of jurisdiction, since such a parochial intrusion would hinder the cosmopolitan 
future of the Internet. 
For the British Columbia Court of Appeal, the significance of where the tort 
occured was twofold: it highlighted the evidentiary deficiencies that 
demonstrated neither actual readership in Texas nor intent on the part of the 
defendant to address a Texas audience.50 The court noted that the defendant did 
not manifest an intention “to enter any particular jurisdiction” and so “[i]t 
would create a crippling effect on freedom of expression if, in every jurisdiction 
the world over in which access to Internet could be achieved, a person who 
post[ed] fair comment on a bulletin board could be ha[u]led before the courts of 
each of those countries where access to this bulletin could be obtained.”51 The 
“everywhere and anywhere” narrative allowed the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal to discount the other connecting factors considered by the trial judge 
regarding the plaintiff’s ties to Texas while justifying the privileging of global 
address over local effects. 
Subsequent to Braintech II, Canadian private-international-law cases 
involving online defamation appear to have diverged from the dominant U.S. 
approach shared by the Canadian court in Braintech II—an approach that 
makes “targeting” of territorial audiences by defendant publishers a primary 
consideration.52 This trend has generated commentary claiming that the 
substantive differences in the defamation laws of the United States and of 
Commonwealth countries have pushed the former and latter in different 
directions.53 A 2007 review of media law appearing in the Harvard Law Review, 
for instance, suggests that “[a]lthough these inconsistent jurisdictional tests are 
a matter of procedure, they stem from different substantive laws and from 
Commonwealth courts’ underlying unfriendliness to U.S. free speech 
protections.”54 There are at least two problems with this assessment. The first 
problem is that these comments cast the reasoning of Commonwealth countries 
in negative terms—that is, as anti-American, where “American” stands in for 
expansive free-speech protections that are deemed to be most appropriate to 
the promotion of a cosmopolitan and progressive Information Society. The 
second problem is that such comments inadequately analyze the so-called 
“procedural variances” as a key arena for parsing the legal technologies that are 
 
 49. See infra II.B. 
 50. See Braintech II, 171 D.L.R. (4th) 46 para. 65 (Can.). 
 51. Id. paras. 62–63. 
 52. See, e.g., Bangoura v. Washington Post, [2004] 235 D.L.R. (4th) 564 (Can.), rev’d, [2005] 258 
D.L.R. (4th) 341 (Can.); Burke v. NYP Holdings, Inc., [2005] 48 B.C.L.R. 363 (Can.). 
 53. Developments in the Law, The Law Of Media, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (2007). 
 54. Id. 
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used to reach positive (rather than purely negative) ends. An alternative way to 
understand the divergence of Commonwealth countries from the United States 
would be to note the decline in the “everywhere and anywhere” narrative’s 
potency as a deterrent. This decline is accompanied in Commonwealth 
countries by a turn toward using legal technologies to work out a positive 
rationale for reclaiming the legal relevance of the receipt of information to the 
information exchange that is so central to cosmopolitan visions of global online 
communications. 
In the much-publicized- and discussed Australian defamation case, Gutnick 
v. Dow Jones and Co., Inc., for instance, the defendant, a U.S. publisher, 
attempted to persuade the court to decline to hear the case even though the 
plaintiff had established that the defendant had Australian subscribers to its 
online publication, thereby manifesting at least some intention to reach an 
Australian audience even by the U.S.-favored “targeting” standard.55 The 
defendant also argued that for any court other than one sitting in defendant’s 
home jurisdiction to hear the case would result in unlimited liability worldwide 
for online publishers.56 The Victoria court rejected this argument, noting that, 
although the defendant argued “such a narrow rule was appropriate for the age 
of globalization[,] [i]t was, of course, also appropriate for his client.”57 With this 
statement, the trial court deflated the public-policy argument that invoked a 
particular vision of cosmopolitanism as merely a guise for its rhetorical 
opposite—namely, the promotion of two parochial interests. One was national: 
that “every hit on a U.S. Web site that unearthed a defamatory statement 
simultaneously created the U.S. forum to decide the issue.”58 Another, the most 
parochial interest of all, was an individual self-interest.59 Although there is 
undoubtedly resistance in the trial court’s judgment to adopting a principle that 
would result in U.S. courts’ dominating online content disputes,60 the court’s 
reasoning is less hostile to U.S. law per se than it is to the defendant’s efforts to 
negate the significance of the Australian audiences for U.S. online publications. 
It is this aspect of Dow Jones that has been picked up by Canadian courts. 
Courts in four Internet-jurisdiction cases have cited Dow Jones, including the 
Supreme Court of Canada.61 Dow Jones stands mainly for the proposition that a 
 
 55. (2001) V.S.C. 305 para. 1–2 (Austl.) [hereinafter Gutnick], aff’d sub nom. Dow Jones & Co. 
Inc. v. Gutnick, (2002) 194 A.L.R. 433 (Austl.) [hereinafter Dow Jones]. Some critics have 
mischaracterized the decision as holding that accessibility alone is enough. See, e.g., Yulia A. 
Timofeeva, Worldwide Prescriptive Jurisdiction in Internet Content Controversies: A Comparative 
Analysis, 20 CONN. J. INT’L L. 199, 201 (2005) (“Australia exercised even more expansive authority and 
delivered a defamation judgment against a foreign respondent whose contact with the country was 
limited to defamatory Internet material accessible within Australia.”). 
 56. Gutnick, VSC 305 para. 16. 
 57. Id. para. 17. 
 58. Id. para. 76. 
 59. Id. para. 74. 
 60. Id. para. 73. 
 61. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Ass’n of Internet 
Providers (SOCAN III), [2004] 240 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (Can.); Bangoura v. Washington Post, [2004] 235 
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territory in which Internet content is received may, in appropriate 
circumstances, assume jurisdiction over a dispute arising from that content.62 
The possibility of exercising jurisdiction over disputes arising from content 
received in Canada demarcates the limits around the “everywhere and 
anywhere” narrative, such that Internet borderlessness translates into unlimited 
liability only when courts truly base their authority on mere accessibility alone, 
as opposed to proof of actual receipt by a more-than-incidental audience. 
The second narrative line that gives meaning to Internet borderlessness—
“here, there (and everywhere)”—clarifies that information crossing a particular 
border has legal consequences. It does this by starting from the premise that the 
capability of crossing all borders does not necessarily negate the significance of 
a specific, local-border crossing. 
B. Here, There (and Everywhere) 
In response to legal scholars who argued for treating Internet 
communications as exempt from more local controls,63 other legal scholars 
reasserted the significance of territorial authority in a variety of ways. Jack 
Goldsmith, for instance, argued against Johnson and Post’s argument for self-
governance by considering claims arising from the Internet’s disruptiveness to 
be overblown.64 For Goldsmith, the Internet posed no truly new problems that 
private international law could not handle by established means.65 In his recent 
book with Tim Wu, Goldsmith’s assessment is historically borne out, as national 
governments are chronicled to have succeeded in asserting authority over 
Internet communications that enter their territory, through various coercive 
means.66  Goldsmith and Wu cast themselves as realists, deflating the 
exaggerated rhetoric surrounding the threat posed by the assertion of national 
authority while casting as naïve the thought that nation-states were ever really 
going away.67 
Other scholars, such as Neil Netanel and Joel Reidenberg, are less focused 
on the will of existing territorial nations than they are on the implications of 
embracing means of deciding legal disputes that thwart the assertion of 
 
D.L.R. (4th) 564, rev’d, [2005] 258 D.L.R. (4th) 341 (Can.); Barrick Gold Corp. v. Blanchard & Co., 
[2003] 9 B.L.R. 316 (Can.); Burke v. NYP Holdings, Inc., [2005] 48 B.C.L.R. 363 (Can.). 
 62. Dow Jones, (2002) 194 A.L.R. 433 para. 54 (Austl.). 
 63. See, e.g., Delacourt, supra note 22, at 34; Trakman, supra note 22, at 281. 
 64. Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1221 (1998). Goldsmith 
identified the slippery slope of the “everywhere and anywhere” narrative, noting that “this potential 
threat of liability is relatively insignificant and does not come close to the skeptics’ broad descriptive 
claims about massive multiple regulation of individual users.”Id. 
 65. Id. at 1206. 
 66. JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A 
BORDERLESS WORLD 184 (2006). 
 67. Id. at 10. 
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democratically established legal principles.68 There are traces of these 
viewpoints in the Gutnick and Dow Jones decisions, in which the assertion of 
Australian jurisdiction is consciously deployed as a counterweight to 
exaggerated “everywhere and anywhere”-style rhetoric.69 
Paul Schiff Berman takes a different approach to reasserting the local. On 
the one hand, he criticizes the inappropriate assertion of territorial authority 
(his main examples come from U.S. courts that engage private-international-law 
methods inadequately, if at all); on the other, he proposes that private 
international law could take account of multiple community affiliations that are 
not strictly territorial or citizenship-based by taking a “cosmopolitan pluralist” 
approach.70 In doing so, Berman reclaims the term “cosmopolitan” from the 
global in the service of the local, by which he means something other than mere 
national interest. 
Although Berman’s cosmopolitan–pluralist approach is cast as an 
alternative to existing approaches to Internet disputes, the assumption of 
jurisdiction over Internet disputes in Canada is arguably already showing 
indications of being something other than merely the assertion of territorial 
sovereignty.71 The “here, there (and everywhere)” narrative line builds on 
private international law’s capacity to legally manage events occurring in more 
than one place (“both here and there”72) and refines this observation for the 
Internet context by considering the circumstances in which “something more” 
than mere accessibility of Internet content warrants a court’s hearing a dispute. 
The exercise of setting out the “something more” is an effort toward 
determining when a foreign audience is deemed to become legally relevant—
based not on territoriality per se, but rather on something closer to Berman’s 
notion of community affiliation. 
Burke v. NYP Holdings, in which a British Columbia court faced a 
defamation action against a U.S. publisher, is a particularly interesting 
Canadian example of the “here, there (and everywhere)” narrative.73 Although 
a British Columbia readership could be established, the manifest intention by 
the defendant publisher to cultivate that readership was absent.74 The court held 
that it could properly exercise jurisdiction and apply local law because it was 
foreseeable that plaintiff would bring suit in the forum. The court’s 
foreseeability determination rested on two findings. First, plaintiff had an 
 
 68. See Neil W. Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View From Liberal Democratic 
Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395, 405 (2000); Joel R. Reidenberg, Yahoo and Democracy on the Internet, 42 
JURIMETRICS J. 261, 263 (2002). 
 69. See Dow Jones, (2002) 194 A.L.R. 433 para. 54 (Austl.); Gutnick (2001) VSC 305 para. 76 
(Austl.); see also supra II.A. 
 70. Paul S. Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 478 (2002); Paul S. 
Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining Governmental Interests in a 
Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819, 1821 (2005). 
 71. See, e.g., Burke v. NYP Holdings, 48 B.C.L.R. 363 (Can.). 
 72. Libman v. R, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178 para. 63 (Can.) (case concerning multi-jurisdictional fraud). 
 73. 48 B.C.L.R. 363 at paras. 32–33 (Can.). 
 74. Id. at paras. 3–4, 8. 
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established reputation in British Columbia. Second, it was foreseeable that a 
British Columbian audience would be interested in plaintiff’s online newspaper 
column, regardless of whether the foreign defendant intended to address that 
audience.75 The determination of a foreseeable British Columbia audience 
centers on the fact that the original event that inspired the column had occurred 
in Vancouver at a Canucks hockey game and had enjoyed ongoing interest in 
British Columbia, and that the allegedly defamatory statements were about a 
person of interest to British Columbians—namely plaintiff Brian Burke, then-
General Manager of the Canucks.76 When combined with the strong cross-
border reputation of the defendant’s newspaper (the New York Post) and its 
sports columnist (Larry Brooks), these facts, the court held, made it foreseeable 
that the online posting of the story would be read in British Columbia by both 
ordinary readers and the by British Columbia media—even if no paper editions 
were sold in British Columbia.77 
Although a prominent line of U.S. defamation cases descending from Calder 
v. Jones78 similarly raised what one court called the “geographic focus” of a 
story as a relevant consideration,79 the Burke decision differs from U.S. cases in 
that it further considers the scope of the content provider’s influence to be 
relevant. The court in Burke wrote, 
While the Defendants have little or no business connection in British Columbia, it is 
clear that the Post is a major newspaper in what many describe as the financial capital 
of the United States which, in turn, is described by many as the most powerful country 
in the world. By establishing a website which is available on the Internet worldwide, it 
is reasonably foreseeable that the story set out in the Column would follow Mr. Burke 
to where he resided. The concept of a “worldwide web” is aptly named.80 
 
 75. The Burke decision can be usefully paired with Young v. New Haven Advocate, in which the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed a lower court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a suit 
arising from allegedly defamatory statements about a Virginia prison warden that were published in an 
article in the online version of a Connecticut newspaper. 315 F.3d 256, 258 (4th Cir. 2002). The Young 
decision concerned a local newspaper, however, whereas Burke dealt with a newspaper with 
international reputation. A tendency to overlook such important distinctions affecting the 
determination of the foreseeability of particular audiences is evident in the note, A ‘Category-Specific’ 
Legislative Approach to the Internet Personal Jurisdiction Problem in U.S. Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
1617, 1629 (2004), where the editors compare Dow Jones and Young, stating that the court in Young 
“could not exercise jurisdiction over two Connecticut newspapers in a defamation action brought by a 
Virginia resident simply because the allegedly defamatory articles were available on websites.”  As 
discussed above in part II.A, Dow Jones did not assume jurisdiction merely because the defamatory 
article was available on websites, but rather because it was actually accessed in Australia by Australian 
subscribers. 
 76. Burke v. NYP Holdings, 48 B.C.L.R. 363 para. 32 (Can.). The event was the “sucker-punch” hit 
by Canucks-player Todd Bertuzzi on Colorado Avalanche player Steve Moore that resulted in 
Bertuzzi’s being charged with assault causing bodily harm. ESPN.com, Canucks Star Charged With 
Assault (Jun. 25, 2004), http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/news/story?id=1827388 (last visited Apr. 19, 
2008). 
 77. Id. para. 29. 
 78. Calder  v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
 79. Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 476 (2002). In Calder, the Court considered the most relevant 
fact to be, instead, that the defendant-publisher had a significant print circulation in California, where 
the plaintiff lived and worked. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 785 (1984). 
 80. Burke v. NYP Holdings, 48 B.C.L.R. 363 para. 33. 
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What the court articulates here is the position that not all publications are equal 
on the Internet, in that a newspaper with an international reputation must own 
up to its international influence and cannot relegate to legal irrelevance online 
audiences from jurisdictions with a substantial connection to a story.81 
The Burke decision has been called into question by some commentators82 
who note that the case relies in part on the Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
decision in Bangoura v. Washington Post (Bangoura I), which was overturned 
on appeal.83 However, the facts in Burke differ substantially from those in 
Bangoura I in that the geographic focus of the impugned article in Bangoura I 
was not Ontario, let alone anywhere in Canada, and the Bangoura I plaintiff did 
not even live in Canada at the time of the initial publication.84 The Ontario 
Court of Appeal thus rightly considered the connection between Ontario and 
the publication to be minimal and so not sufficient to establish jurisdiction.85 In 
other words, the issue of the relevance of the Canadian audience was 
overlooked by the trial judge in Bangoura I, so jurisdiction was improperly 
exercised on the mere basis of plaintiff’s current residence. 86 
Although substantive differences between U.S. and Canadian defamation 
law are undeniable, they do not account entirely for the move to consider the 
relevance of Canadian audiences within the scope of a defendant’s sphere of 
influence as part of the private-international-law process. Indeed, Canadian 
courts have considered the significance of receiving online communications in 
their jurisdiction analyses, and have not limited this approach exclusively to 
defamation actions.87  This has shaped the meaning of Internet “borderlessness” 
in Canada to include the possibility that receipt in some cases may be enough to 
warrant the exercise of local jurisdiction. In Burke, the court appeared to accept 
that, regardless of intention, if a major newspaper chooses to write about a 
British Columbia-based person concerning a British Columbia-based event, a 
British Columbia audience for that content exists.88 In other words, another way 
to frame the “here, there (and everywhere)” narrative is to consider it engaged 
in legally inscribing wider borders around the relevant online community 
regardless of geographic territory—that is, to be defining the relevant public as 
 
 81. Similar reasoning appeared in Wiebe v. Bouchard, in which the British Columbia Supreme 
Court held that a British Columbia resident could bring an action for defamation against a Quebec 
author of a report issued by the federal government since the audience for the report was nationwide. 
[2005] B.C.L.R. 47 (Can.). 
 82. See Brian MacLeod Rogers, Commentary: Appeal Case Helps Close the Door to “Libel 
Tourists,” 25 LAWYERS WEEKLY, Oct. 28, 2005. 
 83. [2004] 235 D.L.R. (4th) 564 (Can.), rev’d, Bangoura v. Washington Post (Bangoura II), [2005] 
258 D.L.R. (4th) 341 (Can.). 
 84. Bangoura II, [2005] 258 D.L.R. (4th) 341 para. 22 (Can.). 
 85. See id. para. 46. 
 86. Id. para. 29. 
 87. See, e.g., Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Can. v. Can. Ass’n of Internet 
Providers (SOCAN I), [1999] 1 C.P.R. (4th) 417 (Can.), rev’d in part, SOCAN III, [2004] 240 D.L.R. 
(4th) 193 (Can.). 
 88. Burke v. NYP Holdings, Inc., [2005] 48 B.C.L.R. 363 at para. 29 (Can.). 
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that with which a defendant’s Internet activity is engaged and so to set the scale 
of that activity in a globalized online world.89 Through the “here, there (and 
everywhere)” narrative, courts can claim that if the public addressed by the 
defendant’s activity meaningfully includes the population of the forum 
jurisdiction, then the forum court may be entitled to exercise jurisdiction and to 
apply local law. 
Although much of the rhetorical work is done by these narratives, the legal 
meaning of the Internet’s borderlessness is also shaped by courts’ procedural 
rules and is rationalized as most appropriate to address the novel issues raised 
by Internet technology. 
III 
TECHNIQUES MEET TECHNOLOGIES 
Private international law has been characterized as being particularly 
enamored of the technical or, more properly, both enamored and repelled by its 
own preoccupation with the technical—that is, the rules, lists of factors, and 
other doctrines and methods for resolving disputes.90 It is no wonder, then, that 
a technological phenomenon culturally invested with the potential to achieve 
either internationalism or non-nationalism would not only use private 
international law’s tools, but would both inspire complaints about their 
inadequacy and demands for new tools. Another layer of drama playing out in 
the interjurisdictional cases involving the Internet, then, is far more 
fundamental: namely, it is a debate about the function of law as an instrument, 
and, further, what sort of legal instrument is most compatible with the 
narratives of the greater public good derived from global communications. 
This drama plays out in two primary contexts: (1) in cases in which private 
international law’s encounter with the Internet inspires a search for simple and 
uniform rules for determining interjurisdictional legal issues, often basing those 
rules in the mechanics of Internet technology itself;91 and (2) in cases preferring 
multiple-factor analysis as a way to accommodate the complexities of cross-
border relationships created via Internet communications.92 Although the 
cosmopolitan–parochial rubric centrally shapes the consideration of the 
substantive-law issues and the public-policy rationales put forward in cases 
 
 89. See Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, supra note 70, at 436–37. Berman states that 
“the exercise of jurisdiction may encourage corporate officials to rethink their sense of responsibility to 
communities far beyond the boundaries of their corporate headquarters.” Id. Berman goes on to say 
that “the assertion of community membership is relevant to discussions of Internet jurisdiction as well” 
and that “the growth of electronic communications is closely linked to our increasing global economic 
and psychological interdependence.” Id. at 437. “Given this change in economic and psychological 
interdependence,” Berman writes, “it would not be surprising to see the definition of community 
membership change as well. And if jurisdiction is one of the ways we express our intuitions about 
community membership, then jurisdictional rules, in turn, must evolve.” Id. 
 90. Riles, supra note 5, at 977. 
 91. See infra III.A. 
 92. See infra III.B. 
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dealing with the cross-border flow of information, preference for simplicity or 
complexity is the primary rubric through which the appropriateness of 
procedural approaches have been debated. The simplicity–complexity rubric is 
of course not unique to Internet disputes. Rather, it has a long history in 
conflicts case law and scholarship. Some conflicts scholars have championed 
complexity as the more sophisticated and better way to deal with the public-
policy needs of modern life.93  Others have championed simplicity as a return to 
a more-principled concern for basic, fundamental rights that have been lost.94 
Although promoting complexity or simplicity can be (and has been) at times 
connected with particular ideological orientations toward the role of law, in the 
Internet context, the orientation toward simplicity or complexity is not clearly 
aligned with any particular worldview, and both orientations claim that the 
chosen approach will be more fair and more likely to achieve just results. The 
following analysis of the procedural approaches in Internet cases highlights 
simplicity and complexity as legal vocabulary employed by courts, vocabulary 
that is particularly potent whenever the law encounters a new or perceived-to-
be-new phenomenon.95 
A. Single-Situs Tests and Technological Determinism 
In the Internet’s initial encounter with private international law, a common 
response of courts to the bewildering circumstance of Internet communication 
has been to simplify the legal analysis.96 Courts often reached for classic 
formalist rules to determine the jurisdictional and choice-of-law issues, such as 
lex loci delicti: the place where the tort was committed determines the forum 
and choice of law.97 Embracing formalist rules such as this transforms the 
private-international-law exercise into a matter of determining where torts 
committed via Internet technology occur, rather than requiring the balancing 
and weighing of multiple factors that shape the relationships between the 
parties and the various locations implicated in the dispute. The British 
Columbia Court of Appeal’s decision in Braintech II 98 boils down all the 
 
 93. See, e.g., Walter Wheeler Cook, An Unpublished Chapter of the Logical and Legal Bases of the 
Conflict of Laws, 37 ILL. L. REV. 418, 423 (1943). As Riles writes, discussing and quoting Cook, “Cook 
himself at times resorted to a version of this external explanation of legal change where he suggested 
that the failure of the First Restatement was attributable to its inability to adapt to the new scale of 
complexity of the modern world: ‘Just as in physics, chemistry and biology today’s theories are much 
more complex than those current in the Victorian period, so in the field of legal science theories if they 
are to be adequate must take account of the complexities of modern social economic life.’” Riles, supra 
note 5, at 1017. 
 94. See, e.g., Lawrence Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 343 (1990). 
 95. Anthropologist Marilyn Strathern notes that questions of scale always plague analytical 
projects, such that the relative simplicity or complexity of the framing of a problem (or by extension its 
solution) is part of the process of setting out the parameters of the study. See MARILYN STRATHERN, 
PARTIAL CONNECTIONS, (AltaMira Press updated ed., 2004) (1991). 
 96. See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997); 
Bangoura I, 235 D.L.R. (4th) 564 para. 30 (Can.); SOCAN I, [1999] 1 C.P.R. (4th) 417 para. 84 (Can.). 
 97. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 930 (8th ed. 2004). 
 98. Supra II.A. 
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connecting factors in that case to the issue whether the defamation could 
properly be said to have occurred in Texas.99 Similarly in Gutnick and Dow 
Jones, the courts determined that the place where the defamation occurred was 
the Australian state of Victoria, which eliminated the need to consider other 
jurisdictional and choice-of-law issues.100 Many American cases have likewise 
turned on the interpretation of states’ long-arm statutes,101 which tend to feature 
lex loci delicti rules.102 
A prominent subset of cases embracing a formalist approach reaches for 
further simplicity by positing that Internet technology itself should determine 
the place where the tort, contract, or other legal relationship occurred.103 An 
example of such an embrace of simplicity is the Copyright Board of Canada’s 
conclusion in what became SOCAN III on its appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Canada:104 “Communications occur at the site of the server from which the work 
is transmitted, without regard to the origin of the request or the location of the 
original Web site.”105 The Board elaborated that the “place of origin of the 
request, the location of the person posting the content and the location of the 
original Web site are irrelevant.”106 Such a “place of the server” rule has been 
endorsed by some legal scholars as ensuring a desirable predictability in online 
disputes, as well as by dissenting Supreme Court of Canada Justice LeBel in 
SOCAN III; he stated that such a rule “provides a straightforward and logical 
rule for locating communications occurring within Canada that will be readily 
applicable by the Board in setting tariffs, by the courts in infringement 
proceedings, and by solicitors in providing advice to their clients.”107 
By reducing the determination of jurisdiction and choice-of-law to a 
question of the location of the tort or the location of a physical machine, these 
 
 99. Braintech, Inc. v. Kostiuk, [1999] 171 D.L.R. (4th) 46 (Can.). 
 100. Dow Jones (2002) 194 A.L.R. 433 paras. 48, 51, 52 (Austl.); Gutnick (2001) VSC 305 para. 124, 
130 (Austl.). The court in Dow Jones noted that the plaintiff has limited his suit to damages sustained in 
Victoria, Australia, for publications in Victoria, and that if the plaintiff had sought to sue for damages 
resulting from publications elsewhere, that the court would have had to undergo a different analysis, 
taking into account the reasonableness of the publisher’s actions in those locations. Dow Jones, 194 
A.L.R. 433 para 49 (Austl.). 
 101. See, e.g., Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 242–44 (2d Cir. 2007); People Solutions, 
Inc., v. People Solutions, Inc., No. 399-CV-2339, 2000 WL 1030619, at *1–2 (U.S. Dist. Tex. July 25, 
2000). 
 102. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 930 (8th ed. 2004). 
 103. Many early judgments involving the Internet devoted a significant portion of the decision to 
explaining how Internet technology works. These lengthy descriptions are also a symptom of the 
disruption caused by the Internet, in that the relevance of the technical features of the Internet to the 
facts of the case is often unclear and tenuous, resulting in an excess of technical description. See, e.g., 
Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 849–54 (1997). 
 104. SOCAN III, [2004] 240 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (Can.). 
 105. SOCAN I, [1999] 1 C.P.R. (4th) 417 para. 84 (Can.), rev’d in part, SOCAN III, [2004] 240 
D.L.R. (4th) 193 (Can.). 
 106. Id. para 151. The Board concedes one proviso to this rule—that content specifically intended to 
be communicated to Canadians may also be considered to occur “in Canada”—though the Board 
merely considers this issue to remain open. Id. para 155. 
 107. SOCAN III, 240 D.L.R. (4th) 193 at para. 146 (Can.) (LeBel, J., dissenting).  
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approaches claim that a straightforward rule makes both the conduct of 
business and the administration of law easier and more predictable, and hence 
fairer. Some legal scholars have endorsed a view that the Internet calls for such 
straightforward, predictable rules.108 Those espousing the complexity approach, 
however, also claim a greater likelihood of achieving fairness by considering 
simple rules to be arbitrary and more likely to produce unjust results in 
individual cases than a complex multiple-factor analysis.109 
B. Applying Connecting Factors Methods: Protecting Home Interests or a 
New Conception of Jurisdiction? 
In Canada, Supreme Court Justice La Forest set out a complex approach 
weighing factors that assess whether a “real and substantial connection” exists 
between the dispute and the jurisdiction as more appropriate to global human 
society: 
It seems to me that the approach of permitting suit where there is a real and 
substantial connection with the action provides a reasonable balance between the 
rights of the parties. It affords some protection against being pursued in jurisdictions 
having little or no connection with the transaction or the parties. In a world where 
even the most familiar things we buy and sell originate or are manufactured 
elsewhere, and where people are constantly moving from province to province, it is 
simply anachronistic to uphold a “power theory” or a single situs for torts or contracts 
for the proper exercise of jurisdiction.110 
A second line of Internet cases similarly eschews the simplified, formalist 
approach in favor of multi-factor methods for determining whether a sufficient 
connection exists between the suit and the forum.111 In Canada, the analysis 
involves considering a range of factors regarding the relationships between the 
parties, the cause of action and the various implicated locations so as to 
determine whether the suit has a “real and substantial connection” to the 
forum.112 In the United States, this type of analysis tends to be more defendant-
focused, namely by looking at whether the defendant has passed the threshold 
of  “minimum contacts” with the forum113 and whether exercising jurisdiction 
would not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial choice” 
guaranteed by the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution.114 
 
 108. See, e.g., Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet 
Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 1347 (2001) (Geist includes implied intent to target as 
sufficient in some circumstances, such as defamation, though the contours of this implied intent are not 
elaborated and remain defendant-focused); see also Julie L. Henn, Targeting Transnational Internet 
Content Regulation, 21 B.U. INT’L L.J. 157, 158 (2003); Andrew F. Halaby, You Won’t Be Back: Making 
Sense of “Express Aiming” After Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 625, 661 
(2005). 
 109. See, e.g., Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Borders on, or Border Around—The Future of the Internet, 
16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 343, 373–80 (2006). 
 110. Morguard Invs. Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 para. 51 (Can.) (emphasis added). 
 111. SOCAN III, 240 D.L.R. (4th) 193 para. 59–61 (Can.); Bangoura II, 258 D.L.R. (4th) 341 para. 
46; Burke v. NYP Holdings, Inc., [2005] 48 B.C.L.R. 363 para. 29 (Can.). 
 112. Morguard Invs. Ltd., 3 S.C.R. 1077 para. 51 (Can.). 
 113. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 114. Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
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The most prominent Canadian case touching on online jurisdiction and 
employing the “real and substantial connection” approach is the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s decision in SOCAN III. Interestingly enough, SOCAN III 
was not a typical private-international-law dispute; rather, it concerned the 
authority of the Copyright Board of Canada to impose a tariff on parties 
involved in the communication of copyright-protected works to the public via 
telecommunications and the Internet.115 In other words, this case cast the issue 
whether Canadian territorial law applies to Internet transmissions originating 
outside Canada as a private-international-law problem.116 Eschewing the “place 
of the server” rule espoused by the Copyright Board,117 the court in SOCAN III 
endorsed the “real and substantial connection” approach preferred by the 
Federal Court of Appeal118 and highlighted the significance of the end user’s 
location in terms of broader public-policy considerations: 
At the end of the transmission, the end user has a musical work in his or her 
possession that was not there before. The work has, necessarily, been communicated, 
irrespective of its point of origin. If the communication is by virtue of the Internet, 
there has been a“telecommunication.” To hold otherwise would not only fly in the 
face of the ordinary use of language but would have serious consequences in other 
areas of law relevant to the Internet, including Canada’s ability to deal with criminal 
and civil liability for objectionable communications entering the country from 
abroad.119 
The court’s statement brings home the persistent concern expressed in the other 
Canadian interjurisdictional cases, as well as in the Australian Gutnick case: 
that the crossing of communications into Canada is always at least potentially 
significant.120 Making such an observation allows a country of reception to 
exercise jurisdiction and apply local law in appropriate circumstances, 
depending on the quality of the factors connecting the dispute to the 
jurisdiction where the communication was received. 
Broad policy reasons protecting home interests are at play in the court’s 
categorical refusal to accept the argument that Canada should never assume 
jurisdiction merely on the basis of Canadian reception. In order to refine the 
analysis for determining which conditions of Canadian reception rise to the 
level of real and substantial connection, SOCAN III, like the online defamation 
cases, significantly concerns the legal determination of who the relevant 
 
 115. SOCAN III, 240 D.L.R. (4th) 193 para. 1 (Can.). 
 116. Id. 
 117. SOCAN I, [1999] 1 C.P.R. (4th) 417 para. 84 (Can.), rev’d in part, SOCAN III, 240 D.L.R. (4th) 
193 (Can.). 
 118. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Can. v. Can. Ass’n of Internet Providers 
(SOCAN II), [2002] 4 F.C. 3 para. 186 (Can.), aff’d, SOCAN III, 240 D.L.R. (4th) 193 para. 44 (Can.). 
 119. SOCAN III, 240 D.L.R. (4th) 193 para. 45 (Can.). 
 120. This concern is also expressed in the Australian case, Dow Jones v. NYP Holdings, (2002) 194 
A.L.R. 433 (Austl.). The SOCAN III court’s statement draws on the pre-Internet 1985 Supreme Court 
of Canada judgment in Libman v. R., which held the any tort touching on multiple jurisdictions occurs 
at least “both here and there.” SOCAN III, 240 D.L.R. (4th) 193 para 58–59 (Can.) (quoting Libman v. 
R., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178 para. 74 (Can.)). 
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“public” is.121 The court wrote that the “applicability of our Copyright Act to 
communications that have international participants will depend on whether 
there is a sufficient connection between this country and the communication in 
question.”122 In other words, the relevant connection is with the character of the 
communication itself, not just the content provider per se. By focusing on 
whether Canadians properly constitute a relevant public, recent Canadian cases 
employing private-international-law methods seem to be fundamentally 
engaged in positioning audiences in relation to the rest of the Internet-
participating world.123 They do so in ways that U.S. online-jurisdiction cases 
generally have not, even when U.S. courts do sometimes exercise jurisdiction on 
the basis of receipt alone, due to their defendant-oriented analysis.124 In other 
words, due to the tendency of U.S. case law to see online audiences as 
determined by the intentional actions of the content provider in defamation 
actions,125 U.S. courts do not consider the wider array of factors that influence 
audience formation that Canadian courts have started to consider. 
Canadian courts have therefore turned to a multi-factor approach in order 
to justify assuming jurisdiction on the basis of Canadian audiences in some but 
not all circumstances, since the multi-factored approach is capable of these sorts 
of case-by-case determinations in ways that single-situs rules are not. 
Embracing complexity then allows courts to claim that they are not merely 
giving weight to concern about undermining sovereign authority over home 
territory, but also working at understanding the constitution of online audiences 
as global-community members relevant to the disposition of private-
international-law issues.126 Some legal scholars endorse this type of approach as 
most suitable to the globalized world. Paul Schiff Berman, for instance, argues 
that “just as a rigidly territorial conception of jurisdiction eventually gave way 
in the first part of the twentieth-century to the idea of jurisdiction based on 
 
 121. SOCAN III, 240 D.L.R. (4th) 193 para. 42. Here, copyright protects the exclusive right to 
communicate the work to the public by telecommunications. Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. 42, § 3(1)(f) 
(1985). 
 122. SOCAN III, 240 D.L.R. (4th) 193 para. 57. 
 123. Id. para. 64. 
 124. This occurs most often in intellectual-property-infringement cases. See, e.g., Bunn-O-Matic 
Corp. v. Bunn Coffee Servs. Inc., No. 97-3259, 1998 WL207860 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 1998); Inset Systems, 
Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996). One very interesting U.S. case dealing 
with the delineation of the legally relevant “public,” Voyeur Dorm, L.C. v. Tampa, Florida, is not a 
conflict-of-laws case but one concerning the applicability of a municipal ordinance to a business 
offering adult entertainment to online audiences. 265 F.3d 1232, 1235 (11th Cir. 2001). The court ruled 
that the “public” was scattered in cyberspace, not located in the municipality. Thus, the business was 
not subject to the zoning restrictions regarding adult-entertainment establishments. Id. at 1236–37. 
 125. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 126. Not all Canadian cases are concerned with online community formation. Some have been 
exclusively concerned with sovereign authority (either finding that it obtains—as in Lawson v. 
Accusearch Inc., [2007] 280 D.L.R. (4th) 358 para. 51 (Can.)—or finding that it does not—as in Desjean 
v. Intermix Media, [2006] F.C. 1395 para. 36 (Can.)). Likewise, there have been U.S. cases that appear 
to be more concerned with preserving sovereign authority rather than reinforcing a defendant-focused 
test for determining minimum contacts. See, e.g., Playboy Ent., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 939 F. 
Supp. 1032, 1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
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contacts with a sovereign entity, so too a contacts-based approach must now 
yield to a conception of jurisdiction based on community definition.”127 There is 
an underlying progress narrative at work in Berman’s argument, in which 
complexity is preferable to simplicity in that it is better able to accommodate 
change. Whether associating complexity with progress bears out remains to be 
seen, but it is enough to say here that complexity is being mobilized in the 
service of progress as the best means for ensuring the ongoing relevance of 
Canadian audiences in an increasingly internationalized communications 
context. 
IV 
CONCLUSION: THE EVOLVING  
SIGNIFICANCE OF BORDERS AND “BORDERLESSNESS” 
Dutch artist Lonnie van Brummelen’s 2005 film Grossraum centrally 
features silent footage of three border-crossing points at the edges of Europe: at 
Hrebenne (between Poland and Ukraine), Ceuta (between Spain and Morroco) 
and the disputed “Green Line” in Cyprus (between Greece and Turkey, via 
Cyprus).128 Van Brummelen describes her project as revealing the tension 
between the European processes of removing internal borders while reinforcing 
external borders.129 The footage mainly documents the activity and landscapes at 
or near the crossing points without much editing or other intervention by the 
artist. 
The screening portion of the installation is supplemented with an off-screen 
booklet that includes the correspondence between van Brummelen and the 
bureaucrats responsible for granting van Brummelen permission to film in each 
location. The correspondents voice concern as to how van Brummelen’s project 
will cast the significance of being “outside” of an internally borderless Europe; 
one contact advises van Brummelen, “[T]he Ukraine does not want to be seen 
as an Asian wilderness outside the borders of Europe. They will on the other 
hand certainly appreciate the growing interest in the Ukraine as a neighbor of 
the European Union.”130 Indeed, the correspondence reveals that van 
Brummelen repeatedly ran into sensitivities regarding her filming the “borders 
of Europe.”131 These sensitivities blocked the project altogether from filming in 
Turkey, despite the artist’s admitting to trying to “make use of the ‘prestige’ 
and ‘apolitical’ status of art” to get the necessary permissions.132 
 
 127. Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, supra note 70, at 321. 
 128. GROSSRAUM (Lonnie van Brummelen 2005). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Letter from Darek Szendel to Lonnie van Brummelen, in Lonnie van Brummelen & Siebren de 
Haan, THE FORMAL TRAJECTORY, 7 (text accompanying film triptych Grossraum) (on file with 
author). 
 131. Id. at page 26–27. 
 132. Lonnie van Brummelen, Artist, Master Class given at the Cinematheque Ontario (Apr. 6, 
2007) (manuscript on file with author). 
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In other words, no matter how innocuously presented, both the dissolution 
and the fortification of borders are inherently laden with political and cultural 
significance. The project highlights the unevenness of meaning ascribed to 
national borders and is consequently an antidote to globalization rhetoric. 
The project undertaken in this article is parallel to Grossraum, in that it 
tackles the task of charting primarily Canadian private international law’s 
evolving orientation to jurisdictional borders and their significance in the online 
context. The underlying insight is that, whereas the advent of Internet 
communications led to calls for simple, consistent, globally harmonized 
approaches to determining jurisdiction and the applicability of local law, this 
consistency has ultimately not inspired confidence in Canada, mostly due to the 
unequal significance of borders to different populations—especially Canada vis-
à-vis the United States. 
The account of Canadian private international law’s encounter with the 
Internet as charted in this article reveals that the procedural aspects of the case 
law are as engaged in determining the significance of borders as substantive-law 
analyses, both of which rely quite heavily on public-policy rationales. On the 
procedural plane, competing theories of the appropriateness of simple versus 
complex methods each claim greater likelihood of achieving just ends in a 
globalized communications environment, but the theories share a common view 
that Internet communications are creating multi-jurisdictional relationships that 
cannot be so easily territorialized. On the substantive issues, positioning local 
law in relation to online disputes has commonly been rhetorically framed either 
favorably in terms of cosmopolitanism, or negatively in terms of parochialism. 
From the various deployments of cosmopolitanism emerge two parallel moves: 
on the one hand, reinforcing or diminishing territorial borders as the 
globalization rhetoric predicts, but on the other, determining whether Internet-
communication recipients are members of online communities that are not 
strictly territorially constituted. Taken together, the procedural and substantive 
aspects of Internet tort cases involving more than one jurisdiction are clearly 
grappling with the reconfiguration of audiences in a global communications 
environment, a process that requires courts to think both territorially and 
supra-territorially at the same time. 
